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Abstract 
 
This paper conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between privatization and regulation drawing on data from a 
wide sample of European airports. We find that privatization 
promotes a shift from basic regulation to a situation of more 
detailed or non-regulation, depending on the specific 
characteristics of the privatization process and on the type of 
airport being privatized. Moreover, we report a significant 
association between high traffic volumes and more detailed 
regulation. By contrast, airports where slot allocation is non-
coordinated are significantly associated with non-regulation.   
 
 
JEL classification: L33; L42; L93 
Keywords: Privatization; regulation; air transportation; 
airports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germà Bel is Professor at Universitat de Barcelona and Guest Professor at Barcelona Graduate School 
of Economics. Departament de Política Econòmica. E-mail: gbel@ub.edu. 
Xavier Fageda is Lecturer at Universitat de Barcelona. Departament de Política Econòmica. E-mail: 
xfageda@ub.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements:  
 
We have benefited from financial support provided by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
(ECO2009-06946), and the Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA).  
 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública           Document de Treball 2010/04   pàg. 4 
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                            Working Paper           2010/04   pag. 4 
1. Introduction 
Privatization and liberalization in sectors such as transportation, telecommunications and 
energy have reduced the presence of public firms in these strategic markets. However, such 
policy reforms do not mean that governments no longer intervene in the decisions of the 
new private firms, especially when these firms have substantial market power. Indeed, 
ownership and regulation may constitute alternative forms of government intervention.  
This link between privatization and more detailed regulation means that governments 
can shift their focus from controlling the inputs and processes in the production of public 
services to controlling the performance of the firms that produce these services. The idea 
that governments choose between regulation and public ownership when intervening in 
public services with monopoly characteristics is clear in the contractual approach to 
government intervention promoted by Gómez-Ibáñez (2003). Contemporary examples of 
this type of approach can be traced back as far as the privatization policy adopted in 1930s 
Nazi Germany (Bel, 2010). This process involves a new mode of governance based on the 
shift from a positive to a regulatory state (Majone, 1997). Hence, public ownership is not 
the sole alternative available to guarantee public control.  
This paper examines the link between privatization and regulation in European 
airports. The involvement of private investors in the management of airports has increased 
in recent years. A key factor in this privatization has been government needs to finance 
huge investments in airport capacity in a context of strong budget constraints.1 In addition 
to this, other economic agents involved in the sector have exerted strong pressures; airlines 
are operating in a very competitive market, and are pushing for additional infrastructure 
capacity and greater efficiency in airport activities.  
Empirical evidence regarding the effects of privatization on the efficiency of airports is 
scarce and largely inconclusive (Parker, 1999; Oum et al., 2006, 2008; Perelman and 
Serebrisky, 2010). In this setting, new price regulation frameworks have typically 
accompanied privatization. Hence, privatization can have an indirect effect on efficiency 
through associated changes in price regulation. Indeed, the prices charged by the airport 
operator to airlines for the use of its facilities (runways, terminal buildings, etc.) are usually 
1 Financial pressure was the main rationale underlying airport privatization in the UK (Parker, 1999) 
and Australia (Tretheway, 2008), the two most extensive privatization programs applied to date. 
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subject to some type of regulation in order to limit the potential abuse of market power by 
those airport operators.2 
Our main hypothesis is that the shift from public to private ownership leads to 
significant changes in regulation. In this regard, Albalate, Bel and Fageda (2009) have 
examined case studies of the privatization of Europe’s toll motorways, and conclude that 
privatization is associated with more sophisticated, more formal mechanisms for 
establishing the level and adjustment of toll charges to road users. Here we extend this 
analysis of the relationship between privatization and regulation to airports, a transport 
infrastructure that is experiencing considerable government intervention.  
Our primary contribution relies on providing a more formal and empirical test of the 
dynamic link between privatization and more detailed regulation. Note also that a number 
of differences are to be found in the analysis of airports compared to that of toll 
motorways. First, toll motorways can be considered natural monopolies where the 
opportunities for competition are always very limited. By contrast, the market power of 
each airport varies according to its specific circumstances. And second, users of toll 
motorways are atomistic individuals, while users of airports are large firms (airlines) with 
their own market power. Therefore, airports –unlike network infrastructures- are subject to 
mixed degrees of competition and monopoly characteristics. And national authorities can 
hold different views on just how strong this monopoly is and just how reliable competition 
in the sector is. Thus, the dynamic relationship between privatization and regulation can 
give rise to different responses.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the first section, we undertake a review of 
the literature discussing our main hypothesis. In the second section, we explain the main 
trends affecting the privatization and regulation of airports in Europe. In the third section, 
we formulate and estimate an empirical equation that provides a formal test of the link 
between privatization and more detailed regulation. In the fourth section, we explain the 
ownership structure and regulation procedures for three countries whose experience we 
consider relevant for our purposes here. The last section is devoted to our concluding 
remarks.    
 
 
2 The two main aeronautical charges paid by airline companies are landing fees (i.e., the use the 
airplanes make of the airfield’s installations) and charges for allowing passengers to use terminal 
building facilities. These two aeronautical charges are the focus of airport price regulation.   
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2. Literature review 
Privatization policies involve a shift in the way governments are able to intervene in 
markets. Governments change their own form of public control by replacing public 
ownership with more detailed regulation, in what Majone (1990) called “the rise of the 
regulatory state”. Indeed, governments can change their forms of intervention and use 
control mechanisms to achieve their objectives even while relying on private operators and 
autonomous agencies. This trend has led to a new and emerging mode of governance based 
on the transition from a positive to a regulatory state (Majone, 1997). In a regulatory state, 
governments develop more sophisticated and detailed forms of control as public sector 
activities are subject to restructuring (Hogget, 1996). The regulatory state seeks to rectify 
market failures, such as the absence of competition, so that detailed regulations for firms 
with market power rely heavily on performance indicators.   
Here we examine this shift from public ownership to detailed regulation in a strategic 
sector, namely the delivery of transport infrastructures. In the case of airports, privatization 
gives price regulation a more prominent role since airports generally wiled sufficient market 
power to charge high prices. Hence, the price regulation of airports is required when the 
airport operators enjoy substantial market power. In those instances where such regulation 
is needed, it is generally claimed that optimal regulation of airports should meet the 
following criteria (Oum et al., 2004, 2006, Gillen & Niemeier, 2008):  
i) Independent agencies of the political entities should be responsible for regulation.  
ii) Before prices are finally agreed to, a formal consultation process between airports 
and airlines is required.  
iii) Price regulation should establish the correct incentives for cost reduction and 
investment in additional capacity.  
iv) Price regulation should be established on an individual basis because the market 
power of each airport depends on characteristics such as the volume and type of traffic or 
the potential competition from other airports (Starkie, 2002; Gillen, 2008, Bel & Fageda, 
2010).     
Taking these criteria into account, the following methods of airport regulation can be 
distinguished: 
1) Basic regulation. Under this scheme, prices are set and adjusted according to costs. 
However, the eventual prices depend on regulations or administrative rules that fail to 
make explicit the determinants of either costs or prices. Note that generally airports and 
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airlines do not enter into a formal consultation process. Furthermore, regulation is never 
the responsibility of an independent agency.  
2) Detailed regulation. Under this scheme, a formal mechanism establishes the assets 
that are to be regulated. In addition, prices are set and adjusted each year according to a 
mathematical formula, which considers performance indicators that might include costs, 
revenues, evolution in traffic volume and depreciation rates. In some instances, regulation 
is accompanied by a formal consultation process between airports and airlines. However, 
regulation is not usually the responsibility of an independent agency. 
Among the mechanisms applied in detailed regulation, we should distinguish between 
price-cap and rate-of-return regulations. The latter are based on the principle that prices 
must be set high enough so as to generate revenues that cover total costs, including the 
depreciation of capital as well as a sufficient profit rate. Hence, rate-of-return regulation 
limits the profits of the airport operator on the basis of its historical costs. By contrast, 
price-cap regulation allows airport operators to increase prices in line with the consumer 
price index less a factor X.  
Several studies have examined the relative advantages and disadvantages of price-cap 
and rate-of-return mechanisms. Gillen and Niemeier (2008) provide an extensive review of 
these studies and suggest that price-caps provide better incentives for reducing costs and 
investing in capacity since they constitute a forward-looking mechanism. Indeed, rate-of-
return regulation implies that price setting depends fundamentally on a firm’s past costs. 
Further, price-cap regulation considers potential efficiency improvements made by the 
regulated firm. However, in practice, price-caps usually consider the past costs of the 
regulated firm also so that any differences between price-caps and rate-of-return regulation 
may be modest (Starkie, 2004).    
Note that several authors have claimed that price regulation may not be necessary if it 
is clear that the airport operator’s ability to set high charges is only modest. First, the 
airlines also wield market power that can counter that of the airport manager (Brueckner, 
2002). Second, the threat of re-regulation can in itself constitute an element of dissuasion, 
as illustrated by the case of Australia (Forsyth, 2008). Finally, the airport operators can 
receive incentives to charge lower prices so as to attract more traffic, since the more 
passengers they attract, the higher the volume of revenue generated by the commercial 
activities offered in the airport terminal (Starkie, 2001). However, congested airports may 
have more opportunities to wield their market power, and some kind of regulation might 
therefore be necessary (Basso, 2008). In a similar vein, Fu et al. (2006) forward arguments 
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in favor of a certain degree of regulation since airport charges can have a marked impact on 
the competition between airlines. Indeed, low-cost airlines are more severely affected by 
high prices than network airlines. Finally, Oum et al. (2004) provide a further argument in 
favor of regulation: their empirical analysis shows that price-cap regulation is a more 
adequate mechanism than deregulation because of the incentives it provides for setting 
prices, and making investments and cost reductions 
However, it should be stressed that deregulation does not mean that governments fully 
relinquish the monitoring of airport activities. Airports remain subject to the threat of re-
regulation and the ex-post control exerted by the competition policy authorities. 
Furthermore, any differences between unregulated public airports and airports subject to 
basic regulation are in practice not substantial. Indeed, prices are set directly by the firm 
that manages the unregulated airport, but this may mean a significant difference with basic 
regulation should the firm be controlled fully or partially by private investors.   
3. Privatization and regulation of airports in Europe 
In this section, we examine major trends in the ownership and regulation of airports in 
Europe. In particular, we apply our analysis to those European airports that generate a high 
volume of traffic. Our sample comprises the hundred airports in the European Union, 
Switzerland and Norway with most passenger traffic in 2007. Table A1 in the appendix lists 
the airports used in this empirical analysis. Among the hundred airports included in our 
sample, 17 are located in the United Kingdom, 16 in Spain, 14 in Italy, 11 in Germany, 
eight in France, and four each in Norway and Greece. The remaining countries account for 
three or fewer airports in our sample.    
 Table 1 shows the airport operators in the sample that have been fully or partially 
privatized. The privatization of the British Airport Authority (BAA) in 1987 was the first 
such experience in Europe. At the time of its privatization, the firm was managing three 
airports in the London area (Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted), three airports in Scotland 
(Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow) and Southampton. Since the early nineties, many other 
airport operators have been privatized in the UK. In fact, Manchester airport is currently 
the only large British airport to be fully controlled by a public firm. Note that airport 
privatization in the United Kingdom has generally been more prevalent than in the rest of 
Europe, and it has been of a different nature. Private investors in the UK have taken on 
the management of British airports, and at the same time they have purchased the airport 
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infrastructure and land (with few exceptions, prominent among which is Luton Airport). 
Thus, airport privatization in the UK typically involves the transfer of assets to private 
investors. By contrast, in continental Europe, airport privatization typically means that 
private investors gain control of the firm managing the airport through a long-term 
concession or a management contract, but the government retains ownership of the 
infrastructure and land. Hence, in continental Europe privatization is usually implemented 
through the contracting out of airport management. 
It is clear, therefore, that the airport privatization program has been particularly 
ambitious in the UK, involving full privatization in most cases. However, several large 
airports have also been privatized in Italy and Germany. The privatization of Venice airport 
took place at the same time as that of the BAA. In the middle of the nineties, the operators 
at Fiumicino and Ciampino in Rome and at the airport in Naples were sold to private 
investors. More recently, the airports of Pisa, Torino and Bologna have been fully or 
partially privatized. In Germany, private investors are shareholders of three of the country’s 
largest airports - Frankfurt, Dusseldorf and Hamburg - and a number of others including 
Hanover and Hahn (the latter, however, has recently been returned to public control). 
Finally, several airports in Europe’s capital cities have been fully or partially privatized since 
the mid-nineties. These include Charles de Gaulle and Orly in Paris, Athens, Copenhagen, 
Vienna, Athens, and Budapest. In a similar vein, the operator of the airport in Zurich was 
privatized in 2000. 
When private investors are not key shareholders in the firm managing the airport, 
regional or local governments are typically in charge of individual airports. However, there 
are a number of exceptions to this pattern - for example, the central government manages 
the airports of Amsterdam, Dublin and Prague. In each case, though, there were plans to 
privatize, but they have yet to be implemented. In addition, a number of central 
governments manage airports as a single national system. This is the case of Spain, 
Portugal, Finland, Norway and Romania (and to a lesser extent, Sweden as well). All these 
countries, with the exception of Spain, are characterized by the heavy concentration of air 
traffic in the capital city.    
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the regulation process of airports in Europe. 
As mentioned above, it is generally believed that regulation should be implemented by an 
independent agency; however, in practice, regulation has been introduced by a central 
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government agency in most European countries. The main exception is Germany where 
regional governments are responsible for regulation. Independent regulation has only been 
adopted in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria.  
Price-caps are applied in several airports in the United Kingdom (Heathrow, Gatwick, 
and Stansted) and in other large airports including Dublin, Stockholm-Arlanda, Vienna, 
Budapest, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Hamburg and Copenhagen. Rate-of-return regulation is 
applied in Amsterdam, Brussels, and in those German airports where price-caps have not 
been introduced.  
Note that airports in the United Kingdom and Ireland are not subject to regulation, 
with the exception of those mentioned above. Airports in Switzerland, Poland, and the 
airports of Gothenburg, Prague, Bucharest and Riga are not subject to price regulation 
either. Among these non-regulated airports, only a number of UK airports and Zurich are 
controlled fully or partially by private firms.  
Basic regulation is applied at all other airports, which includes all the airports in Spain, 
Italy, Norway, Greece, Portugal, France (except Paris), and the airports of Helsinki and 
Sofia. Recall that there do not seem to be any major differences between non-regulated 
public airports and those subject to basic regulation. Prices are set directly by the firm that 
manages the airport in the case of non-regulation, a situation that only differs from that of 
a basic regulation scenario when the firm is controlled fully or partially by private investors.     
  Insert Table 2 about here 
At this juncture, it should be pointed out that Directive 2009/12/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2009 on airport charges may lead to major 
changes in the regulation procedures of European countries. This directive has to be 
incorporated within corresponding national legislations before 15 March 2011 and is 
applicable to all airports in the European Union handling more than five million passengers 
each year, as well as to each country’s main airport should it handle fewer than five million 
passengers. The directive establishes that the entity managing the airport should be 
independent and that a formal consultation process should be initiated between airlines and 
airports before charges are finally approved. However, each country is to maintain 
considerable powers of discretion as regards the specific mechanism regulating the 
behavior of the airport operator.3   
3 Furthermore, as stated in article four of the Directive, those countries whose airports are managed 
in an integrated way - as a centralized single system, can opt out from the obligation of establishing 
airport prices based on the costs of each individual airport. 
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4. An empirical analysis of the relationship between the privatization and 
regulation of airports 
As discussed above, privatization places greater importance on assessing the regulation 
mechanisms implemented at each airport. It is our claim that this regulation tends to follow 
more formal procedures when airports are managed by private investors. Indeed, airport 
policy reforms (especially privatization) generally lead to more detailed regulation methods, 
such as price-caps or even de-regulation (when it is clear that the corresponding airport 
wields no market power). 
Table 3 classifies the various airports in our sample in terms of the degree of  
involvement of private investors in their management. Among the 100 airports in the 
sample, 26 are fully controlled by private firms, 11 are partially controlled by private firms 
and the rest are controlled by public administrations at different territorial levels. Table 3 
highlights the existence of substantial differences between public and private airports.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
The average volume of traffic handled by fully private airports is higher than that at 
public airports, while the prices charged by the former are markedly higher.4 In the case of 
partially privatized airports, the mean volume of traffic is notably higher than in the other 
sub-groups of the sample, while prices are similar to those charged by fully privatized 
airports. Here, Bel and Fageda (2010) show by multivariate econometric analysis that the 
prices set by private, non-regulated airports are higher than those set by public airports or 
regulated private airports. Note that this does not necessarily mean that private airports are 
more inefficient than the other airports in the sense that they fail to provide the correct 
incentives for cost reduction and investment. It may well be the case that private non-
regulated airports enjoy a certain degree of market power, but it might also be the case that 
prices at public airports (especially when subject to basic regulation) are artificially low.    
Table 3 also illustrates the relationship between the form of ownership and the 
regulation mechanism. Basic regulation becomes less common as the weight of private 
ownership in the firm managing the airport increases. Price-cap regulation (or rate-of-
4 As outlined above, the two main aeronautical charges paid by airline companies are landing fees 
for the use the airplanes make of the airfield’s installations, and charges for the use the passengers 
make of the terminal building. Our price data include the different rates that airports charge the 
airlines based on information provided by airportcharges.com for 2008. The prices used have been 
fixed with reference to an A-320 aircraft with an occupancy factor of 70% (105 passengers). The 
price is for the whole A-320 but we can argue that we are dealing with rates per passenger since a 
constant occupancy factor is assumed Our price data include the following charges: landing fees, 
rights to approach and park aircraft, charges for using the terminal, noise and safety surcharges 
(where applicable). 
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return regulation) is not common in public airports, while a significant proportion of (fully 
or partially) private airports are subject to some form of detailed regulation. In the case of 
public airports, basic regulation is clearly the dominant form.  
Note that the proportion of non-regulated airports is also significant in the case of 
those that have been fully privatized. In our sample, all the airports that are fully controlled 
by private firms and which are not subject to regulation are located in the UK. As we shall 
see below and in greater detail, airports in the UK are only regulated when it is clear that 
they might enjoy a degree of market power. In continental Europe, only Zurich airport is 
not subject to regulation and this is partially controlled by private firms. All the other non-
regulated airports in continental Europe are managed by a public firm.  
In short, public ownership seems to be associated most frequently with basic 
regulation, whereas private ownership is most frequently associated with detailed 
regulation. In addition, some public airports are not subject to regulation in continental 
Europe while some private airports (which may not enjoy any market power) are not 
subject to regulation in the UK.    
We can provide a more formal test of the relationship between privatization and 
regulation at Europe’s airports by estimating the following equation for airport a:  
Regulation-forma =  + 1Privatea + 2Total_Traffica + 3%National_Traffica + 4Slots  +     (1), 
where the dependent variable, Regulation-form, is a discrete variable that takes the value 
zero in the case of non-regulated airports, it takes the value one in the case of airports 
subject to basic regulation (which is our reference case), and finally it takes the value two in 
the case of airports subject to detailed regulation. Recall that our sample of routes is based 
on the 100 largest airports in the European Union (EU-27), Norway and Switzerland. As 
we outlined above, by basic regulation we refer to a scheme in which prices are fixed by law 
or administrative regulations that do not make explicit the determinants of either costs or 
prices. Furthermore, by detailed regulation we refer to a scheme in which a formal 
mechanism establishes the assets that are regulated, and in which prices are set and adjusted 
each year according to a mathematical formula that considers such aspects as costs, 
revenues, evolution in traffic volume and depreciation rates. Recall also that prices are set 
directly by the firm (public or private) that manages the airport in case of non-regulation. 
The explanatory variables included in equation (1) are the following: 
1) The percentage of private property owned by the management company, Private. 
This variable allows us to test the main hypothesis in our analysis, namely that public 
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ownership and detailed regulation are alternative forms of government intervention in 
markets. Hence, the greater the weight of private investors in the firm managing the 
airport, the lower is the probability of the airport being subject to basic regulation. In this 
context, private airport operators are more likely to be subject to detailed than to basic 
regulation. Given the large proportion of fully private airports in the UK in our sample, we 
can also expect that private airports are more likely to be subject to non-regulation than to 
basic regulation 
2) The airport’s total volume of traffic, Total_Traffic. Price regulation at airports with a 
higher volume of traffic is generally more complex. Note also that large airports may enjoy 
substantial market power. Thus, we expect that the higher the amount of traffic handled by 
an airport, the higher the probability that the airport will be subject to detailed regulation.   
3) Domestic traffic as a percentage of the airport’s total traffic, %National_Traffic. Airport 
policies may be designed to favor national passengers, so airport charges may be 
conditioned by non-explicit and detailed criteria when the proportion of domestic traffic is 
high.5 Hence, as the weight of domestic traffic at the airport increases, the probability of 
the airport being subject to basic regulation is expected to rise.  
4) As regards procedures for allocating slots to airlines to use runaways at the 
corresponding airport, we include a discrete variable that can take the following values. It 
takes the value zero for non-coordinated airports, the value one for schedule-supervised 
airports and the value two for coordinated airports. The International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) classifies airports according to the degree of excess demand when 
establishing procedures for slot allocation. Thus, a distinction is drawn between: (1) non-
coordinated airports where there is no excess demand and the allocation of slots is at the 
discretion of the airport operator; (2) airports where flight schedules have to be supervised; 
and (3) coordinated airports where excess demand requires the application of standard 
procedures for slot allocation (‘grandfather rights’, ‘use-it or lose-it’, criteria for new slots 
and new entrants, etc). This provides an approximate idea of the congestion levels at the 
airports, and also provides an indicator of the use of administrative rules for the allocation 
of slots. Indeed, coordinated airports clearly use administrative rules in allocating slots to 
airlines. Given that basic regulation also implies an administrative rather than solely 
economic approach to airport regulation, we can expect a positive relationship between the 
5 Bel and Fageda (2009) find evidence of airport investment policies that include cross subsidies 
from international users to domestic users.
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likelihood of using basic regulation and administrative rules for coordinating airports. Note 
also that non-coordinated airports must be uncongested airports, so regulation may not be 
so necessary at these airports.   
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation (1). Given the discrete nature of 
the dependent variable, the estimation is made using the multinomial logit technique. As it 
is constructed our discrete dependent variable, the reference case is basic regulation.   
The common factors that might affect airports within the same country should be 
borne in mind. Therefore, the estimation takes into account the possible correlation 
between the standard errors of airports that belong to the same country by considering 
clusters for each country. Additionally, the standard errors are corrected for a possible 
problem of heteroskedasticity derived from a non-constant variance between very different 
observations.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 The overall explanatory power of the model is quite high. The results from the 
estimation confirm our main predictions. Most significantly, detailed regulation is more 
likely than basic regulation when private firms manage airports. Indeed, the variable of 
private ownership takes a positive value when considering the move from basic to detailed 
regulation. As expected, basic regulation is also less common than non-regulation, but this 
is probably only the case in the UK and not on continental Europe. Thus, the private 
ownership variable takes a positive value when we consider the move from basic regulation 
to non-regulation.  
We believe that the very different nature of privatization in the UK and continental 
Europe might explain why privatization presents a significant association with either non-
regulation or more detailed regulation. Privatization in the UK usually involves the full 
transfer of asset ownership (along with airport management services). Greater reliance on 
competition by the British authorities might explain why most private airports are not 
subject to regulation (as is also the case in Australia), whereas only the three largest airports 
– Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted - are subject to (more detailed) regulation. Unlike the 
situation in the UK, privatization in continental Europe usually involves the contracting 
out of airport management through the partial or full privatization of the airport operator, 
whereas asset ownership is retained by the respective government. Because of their nature, 
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concessions are subject to more detailed regulation than public management, which would 
explain the move from basic regulation to more detailed regulation with privatization. 
The remaining variables present the expected sign and are, in the main, statistically 
significant. Interestingly, large traffic volumes appear significantly associated with more 
detailed regulation. By contrast, airports where slot allocation is not coordinated appear to 
be significantly associated with non-regulation. Finally, as expected too, those airports with 
a greater weight of domestic traffic appear to be more closely associated with basic 
regulation.   
5. The relationship between privatization and regulation – three case studies.  
Below, we examine how regulation is implemented in the three largest (in terms of their 
volume of traffic) European air markets: the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain. Table 
5 provides a good overview of the airport data in our sample for these three countries.  
The variation in airport prices is high in the UK and Germany. This suggests that 
differences in airport market conditions might be more marked in these countries, a feature 
which is captured, albeit somewhat approximately, by the variations in traffic (see Table 5). 
By contrast, in Spain, the very small variation in prices between airports is not consistent 
with the heterogeneity that exists between these airports. However, airport prices in Spain 
are relatively low. Note that airports in United Kingdom and Germany are managed on an 
individual basis (with each airport being managed separately, with few exceptions), while 
their counterparts in Spain are managed on a centralized basis: all airports being managed 
by the same government-owned firm.    
Most airports in the United Kingdom face potential competition from other nearby 
airports. By contrast, none of the Spanish airports faces competition owing to their 
centralized management, while few airports in Germany face any potential competition 
from other airports. Finally, none of the airports in the UK is subject to excess demand, in 
the sense that none of them is coordinated in terms of airline slot allocation. By contrast, 
all airports in Spain are coordinated airports, while Germany once again finds itself in an 
intermediate position, having both coordinated and non-coordinated airports. Thus, slots 
in Spain are always allocated in accordance with administrative rules, but this is not 
necessarily the case in the airports of the UK and Germany. 
  
Insert Table 5 about here 
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Below, we explain how regulation has been implemented in the UK, Germany and 
Spain. Note that the intensity of the privatization process has varied markedly in these 
countries. Hence, our analysis of the regulation of airport prices in each of these countries 
should provide further insights into the relationship between privatization and regulation. 
 
a. United Kingdom 
The Airports Act of 1986 determines the ownership structure and regulation of airports 
in the United Kingdom. The seven airports managed by the British Airport Authority 
(BAA) have been privatized and a number of public firms, subject to private regulations, 
have been established as airport operators at the other large airports (Graham, 2008). Since 
1990, many other airport authorities, traditionally owned by regional and/or local 
governments, have been privatized; today government-owned firms are only responsible 
for the airports of Manchester, East Midlands, and a few smaller airports.  
  The Airports Act of 1986 also conferred greater responsibilities and autonomy on the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), an entity independent of the Ministry of Transport, which 
has responsibility for regulation. In turn, the Airports Act also authorized the Ministry of 
Transport to designate the airports that were to be subject to regulation. Thus, a formal 
procedure was established for designating airports for regulation, and the Ministry of 
Transport had to specify the criteria used in reaching this decision.   
In addition, the Competition Authority was given an important role in advising and 
monitoring the CAA. This institutional structure has given rise to various conflicts between 
the Competition Authority and the CAA, to the extent that the regulating entity does not 
always fulfill the criteria as laid down by the Competition Authority in its reports. 
In 1986, four airports - Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, and Manchester – came under 
regulation on the grounds that they enjoyed substantial market power. The process of 
price-capping ensured that annual price increases in the future would be limited to the 
Consumer Price Index less a factor X that comes under review every five years. During the 
five-year regulation period, the airport operator can profit from efficiency improvements 
without having to reduce prices. The CAA establishes the price-increase limits during the 
period of regulation after consulting with the Competition Authority and the airlines. This 
consultation process between airports and airlines is more formal in the cases of Heathrow 
and Gatwick.   
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Factor X is set to guarantee a minimum level of profitability consistent with the cost of 
capital. This profitability is calculated on the basis of predictions of the following elements 
(Starkie, 2004): 1) Air traffic at the airport; 2) Total revenues; 3) Operating expenses, taking 
into account potential efficiency improvements; 4) Investment plans for the following 
years. The latter two elements are used to determine the regulated asset base.   
Since 2003, a specific price-cap formula has been established for each airport so as to 
avoid the distortions caused by cross-subsidies between BAA airports.6 Note also that the 
airport of Manchester has not been subject to regulation since 2008. All the other airports 
operate in a de-regulated environment, although they are constantly under the threat of  
regulation. In fact, the Airports Act provides that the CAA should take measures against 
non-regulated airports if they engage in any anti-competitive practices such as unreasonable 
discrimination between users, the charging of artificially low prices in relation to 
neighboring airports or the use of their market power against airlines operating at their 
sites. Thus, the Competition Authority may identify and recommend sanctions for such 
practices, although the final decision lies with the CAA. 
However, the joint ownership of the seven airports of the BAA – which concentrate 
about 60% of UK traffic - has come under increasing criticism and the Competition 
Authority has recently obliged Ferrovial (the owner of BAA since 2006) to sell the airports 
of Gatwick (already sold), Stansted, and one of the two largest Scottish airports (either 
Glasgow or Edinburgh) over which it has had control. According to the Competition 
Authority (2008), the idea behind breaking up the BAA is to promote competition between 
airports that have, to date, been managed by a sole firm. 
b. Germany 
In general, the owners of the firms responsible for managing German airports have 
been either the federal, regional or local governments, in variable proportions. Since 1990 
the main driver behind the change in the ownership structure of Germany’s airports has 
been the disinvestments made by the federal government in a context of increasing 
financial constraints. Thus, several airports have been partially privatized in recent years, 
including large airports such as Frankfurt, Dusseldorf and Hamburg, and smaller airports 
including Monchengladbach, Hahn, Hanover and Saarbrucken.  
6 Starkie (2004) documents the distortion in competition between Stansted and Luton due to the 
cross-subsidies between Stansted and Heathrow that the regulation system in place prior to 2003 
had permitted.     
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No legal framework operates to condition the price regulation of airports in Germany 
(Müller, Konig and Müller, 2008), while there are just two federal laws establishing that the 
prices charged by airports should be approved by the corresponding regulatory agency. 
Contrary to the rest of Europe, regional governments (rather than the federal government) 
are responsible for regulating airport prices. Thus, there is a potential conflict of interests 
with the regional governments acting as both regulator and airport manager.  
The absence of a common legal framework means there is a broad diversity of 
regulatory regimes in Germany. Thus, some regional regulatory agencies have implemented  
rate-of-return regulation while others have implemented price-cap regulation. In both 
cases, a formal consultation process between airlines and airports is conducted before 
charges are finally approved. In the case of airports subject to rate-of-return regulation, the 
regulatory agency takes into account the following elements when establishing the level of 
profitability allowed for the regulated assets: revenues and costs recorded in the previous 
years, future forecasts as regards costs and investments and compensation for inflation.  
Most airports in Germany are subject to the rate-of-return regulation. However, some 
partially privatized airports, including Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Hanover, have 
entered into private contracts with the airlines operating out of them in order to set prices.7 
These contracts, which require the approval of the regional regulatory agency, have been 
established for a period of four or five years, and involve the adjustment of prices on an 
annual basis according to a formula in which price increases are limited by the Consumer 
Price Index less a factor X. To compute this factor X, both parties to the contract take into 
account past and future costs and revenues. Often these contracts provide for the 
implementation of revenue sharing agreements between airports and airlines so that price 
increases are dependent upon the evolution in traffic volume (Niemeier, 2002; Gillen and 
Niemeier, 2008; Müller, Konig and Müeller, 2008). Thus, both parties to the contract 
establish a sliding scale whereby they agree to share the risk of unexpected variations in 
airport traffic.  
c. Spain 
Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea (AENA) is a public firm, dependent on the 
Ministry of Transport, which manages on a centralized basis more than forty commercial 
airports in Spain. It is also the owner of all the facilities available at these airports. AENA 
7 Since 2007, Frankfurt airport has reverted to the earlier system of rate-of-return regulation.  
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and the Ministry of Transport take all the relevant decisions regarding airports, including 
investments, prices and slot allocations.  
The prices charged by the Spanish airports to the airlines are, therefore, proposed by 
AENA, but the final decision rests with the Spanish Parliament. In theory, airport charges 
are based on the total costs of all airports managed by AENA. However, in practice these 
charges are approved by Parliament, so they are adjusted annually in line with charges for 
other public services. Hence, it would be inaccurate to claim that the prices charged are 
established according to the total costs of the airports. Indeed, the charges are insufficient 
to meet airports costs, and AENA has recorded financial losses since 2007, making it the 
airport operator reporting the largest deficit in the world.  
In Spain, the Civil Aviation Authority, a dependent body of the Ministry of Transport, 
is responsible for setting the goals of national airport policy. However, the authority does 
not play any role in the setting of prices. Finally, there is no consultation process between 
airports and airlines for the fixing of airport charges.  
d. Summary and discussion 
The price regulation analysis of the three countries considered reveals major 
differences. In Spain, both ownership and price regulation are the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Transport. The lack of private investors in the firm that manages all of Spain’s 
airports may explain why a formal price regulation mechanism has yet to be implemented. 
Prices are low in comparison to those set in other countries, which suggests a consultation 
process between airports and airlines has not been deemed necessary. However, 
competition between airports is not possible, slots are allocated through administrative 
rules, and the evolution of prices is not associated to the evolution in costs. In fact, the 
financial situation of the Spanish airports has worsened dramatically in recent years.  
By contrast, private ownership is fairly prevalent in the United Kingdom where price 
regulation – at least, in the three airports where it is practiced - is based on a detailed 
mechanism. There are two independent authorities, the CAA and the Competition 
Authority, which are responsible for the regulation of airport prices. A formal procedure is 
established to designate airports as regulated airports. In this regard, most airports are not 
regulated but some anti-competitive practices are provided for by law and may lead to the 
intervention of the CAA. Prices for regulated airports are subject to a price-cap formula, 
whereby price increases are limited by a factor X that includes several performance 
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indicators. In this regard, there is a consultation process between airlines and airports 
before prices are finally approved. Finally, it should be noted that competition between 
airports in the United Kingdom is possible and airport operators have flexibility in 
allocating slots.  
In Germany, the main particularity lies in the crucial role that regional governments 
play as owners (in many cases) and as regulators of airports. However, several airports have 
been partially privatized in recent years. As for regulation, some airports apply the rate-of- 
return regulation and others (especially those that have been privatized) apply price caps. 
However, there always exists a formal consultation process between the airport and the 
airlines before prices are finally approved (in fact, price caps are based on contracts 
between these two parties) and the price adjustment is dependent upon performance 
indicators. 
To sum up, our analysis of these three cases shows that the privatization of airports in 
Europe seems to be accompanied by a shift towards the introduction of new regulation 
schemes. In Spain, full public management is associated with basic regulation. In Germany, 
partial privatization has been implemented through concessions, while detailed regulation 
mechanisms take into account the interests of the various agents (airports, airlines, and the 
regulation agency) involved in the setting of prices. Finally, privatization in the United 
Kingdom has led in general to the transfer of asset ownership and the implementation of 
price caps at those airports that seem to enjoy market power. All in all, we can conclude 
that ownership and regulation are alternative mechanisms open to governments for 
influencing prices, but this would seem to be particularly true in those cases in which the 
market power of firms is perceived as substantial.  
6. Concluding remarks 
Our analysis contributes to the literature by undertaking an empirical study of the dynamic 
link between privatization and regulation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study providing econometric evidence for the use of privatization and regulation as 
potential substitutes for government intervention. Our analysis provides evidence that 
detailed regulation is a more likely alternative than basic regulation when private firms 
manage airports. Indeed, the private ownership variable acquires a positive value when the 
shift from basic to detailed regulation is considered. As expected, basic regulation is also 
less common than non-regulation in private airports, but this is probably only the case in 
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the United Kingdom, where greater reliance on competition could explain why most 
private airports are not subject to regulation.  
We also found evidence to suggest that potential market power is associated with more 
detailed regulation. Thus, the largest airports have a higher probability of being subject to 
more detailed regulation. By contrast, those airports where slot allocation is not 
coordinated - indicative of their facing fewer congestion problems - have a higher 
probability of being subject to non-regulation.  
Private sector participation seems set to increase over the next few years, given the 
pressure exercised by other agents on airport activity. Indeed, the airlines operate today in a 
highly competitive environment, and demand sufficient capacity from the airports at which 
they carry out most of their operations. And, often, governments face the need to finance 
significant investments in airports at a time of major budgetary restrictions. Privatization 
grants greater importance to regulation to the extent that private managers might have 
greater incentives than public managers to set high prices. Our analysis suggests that this is 
particularly true under certain circumstances, which include the airports’ potential to 
generate traffic, and the use of concession contracts to privatize airport operators. Instead, 
full privatization –involving transfer of asset ownership- might result in non-regulation for 
those airports where market power does not appear to be a potential problem.  
Unlike other transportation infrastructures, such as motorways or railways, airports 
present mixed degrees of competition and monopoly characteristics. Thus, different 
responses might exist to the dynamic relationship between privatization and regulation. In 
addition to this, national policies might have different perspectives on how reliable 
competition is in the sector. The effects of these different national points of view and 
traditions of government intervention can greatly influence the dynamic relationship 
between privatization and regulation. Further research should be undertaken to shed more 
light on this issue. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Privatization of main airports in Europe 
Airport % Private ownership Year (s) of first sale to 
private investors 
London-Heathrow (LHR) 100 1987 
London-Gatwick (LGW) 100 1987 
London-Stansted (STN) 100 1987 
Edimburg (EDI) 100 1987 
Glasgow (GLA) 100 1987 
Aberdeen (ABZ) 100 1987 
Venice (VCE) 71 1987 
Liverpool (LPL) 76 1990 
Glasgow-Prestwick (PIK) 100 1992 
Vienna (VIE) 60 1992-1995-2001 
Copenhagen (CPH) 60.8 1994-1996-2000 
Belfast (BFS) 100 1994 
London city (LCY) 100 1995 
Birmingham (BHX) 51 1997 
Bristol (BRS) 100 1997 
Naples (NAP) 70 1997 
Hahn (HHN) 65 1997 
Rome-Fiumicino (FCO) 95.75 1997-2001 
Rome-Ciampino (CIA) 95.75 1997-2001 
London-Luton (LTN) 100 1998 
Dusseldorf (DUS) 50 1998 
Hannover (HAJ) 30 1998 
Zurich (ZRH) 42 2000 
Hamburg (HAM) 49 2000 
Torino (TRN) 44.29 2000 
Frankfurt (FRA) 29 2001 
Athens (ATH) 45 2001 
Newcastle (NCL) 49 2001 
Malta (MLA) 80 2002-2005 
Brussels (BRU) 62.1 2005 
Budapest (BUD) 75 2005 
Larnaca (LCA) 100 2005 
Pisa (PSA) 78 2005 
Paris-Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 32.5 2006 
Paris-Orly (ORY) 32.5 2006 
Bolonia (BLQ) 13.90 2007 
Leeds (LBA) 100 2007 
  Note: We do not account for further changes in the identity of private investors after the first sale.  
  Source: Gillen and Niemeier (2008), Graham (2006) and web sites of the corresponding airports.  
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Table 2. Method of regulation in European airports 
Country Airports Regulation-method 
United Kingdom Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Manchester Price-caps 
 Rest of airports No regulation 
Spain All airports Basic Regulation 
Italy All airports Basic Regulation 
Germany Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover Price-caps 
 Rest of airports  Rate of return 
France Charles de Gaulle, Orly Price-caps 
 Rest of airports Basic Regulation 
Norway All airports Basic Regulation 
Greece All airports Basic Regulation 
Ireland Dublin Price-caps 
 Shannon, Cork No regulation 
Switzerland All airports No regulation 
Portugal All airports Basic Regulation 
Poland All airports No regulation 
Sweden Stockholm-Arlanda Price-caps 
 Goteborg No regulation 
Belgium All airports Rate of return 
The Netherlands Amsterdam Rate of return 
Other countries Copenhagen, Malta Price-caps 
Other countries Vienna, Budapest Price-caps 
Other countries Helsinki, Sofia Basic Regulation 
Other countries Prague, Bucharest, Riga, Larnaca  No regulation 
Source: Oum et al (2004), Gillen & Niemeier (2008), IATA (2007), Cunha & 
Brochado (2008), and the corresponding civil aviation authorities.  
 
Table 3. Data about airports according to the type of ownership of the managing firm 
Managing 
firm 
Total 
number 
airports 
Mean traffic 
(103 passengers) 
Mean 
prices
% Airports 
with no 
regulation 
% Airports 
with basic 
regulation 
% Airports 
with detailed 
regulation  
Mostly 
private 
26 12821 2455 50% 15% 35% 
Partially 
private 
11 19598 2380 18% 36% 46% 
Public 63 9776 1866 17% 67% 16% 
Source: Eurostat, Airportcharges.com, Oum et al (2004), Gillen & Niemeier (2008), Graham 
(2006), IATA (2007), Cunha y Brochado (2008)  and the corresponding civil aviation authorities. 
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Table 4. Estimates of the equation for regulatory reform (multinomial logit) 
Explanatory variable: Regulatory form From basic regulation to no regulation  
Private 0.033 (0.0101)*** 
Total_Traffic 0.00002 (0.00004) 
%National_Traffic -5.28 (1.64)*** 
Slots -1.64 (0.46)*** 
Intercept 3.46 (1.19)*** 
Explanatory variable: Regulatory form From basic regulation to detailed regulation  
Private 0.020 (0.010)** 
Total_Traffic 0.000086 (0.000037)** 
%National_Traffic -5.06 (1.64)*** 
Slots -0.58 (0.46) 
Intercept 0.67 (1.26) 
N 
Pseudo-R2 
2 (Joint. Significance) 
100 
0.37 
51.24*** 
Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis (robust to heteroskedasticity and 
adjusted for correlation between airports of a same country) 
Note 2: Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Table 5. Data about prices, traffic and competition in sample airports  
Country Total 
airports 
Mean traffic 
(variation 
coef.) 
Mean Prices 
(variation 
coef.) 
Number of 
airports with at 
least other nearby 
airport with a 
different manager 
Number of 
airports with 
excess of 
demand 
Total 100 11648 (1.11) 2076 (0.37) 39 60 
United Kingdom 17 13312 (1.26) 2821 (0.31) 15 4 
Spain 16 11798 (1.13) 1451 (0.02) 0 16 
Germany 11 15791 (0.97) 2110 (0.29) 3 6 
Note: Data on traffic is in thousands of passengers, while data on prices is in Euros.  
Source: Airportcharges.com and Eurostat 
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Annex 
Table A1. Sample of airports used in the empirical analysis 
Airport Airport Airport 
Aberdeen (ABZ) Helsinki (HEL) Stuttgart (STR) 
Alicante (ALC) Heraklion (HER) Tegel (TXL) 
Arlanda (ARN) Ibiza (IBZ) Tenerife North (TFN) 
Amsterdam (AMS) Lanzarote (ACE) Tenerife South (TFS) 
Athens (ATH) Larnaca (LCA) Thessalonica (SKG) 
Basel (BSL) Leeds (LBA) Toulouse (TLS) 
Barcelona (BCN) Linate (LIN) Trondheim (TRD) 
Belfast (BFS) Lisboa (LIS) Turin (TRN) 
Bergamo (BGY) London-Heathrow (LHR) Valencia (VLQ) 
Bergen (BGO) London City (LCY) Warsaw (WAW) 
Bilbao (BIO) Liverpool (LPL) Venice (VCE) 
Birmingham (BHX) Luton (LTN) Verona (VRN) 
Bologna (BLQ) Lyon (LYS) Vienna (VIE) 
Budapest (BUD) Madrid (MAD) Zurich (ZRH) 
Bucharest (OTP) Málaga (AGP)  
Bordeaux (BOD) Malta (MLA)  
Bristol (BRS) Milan-Malpensa (MXP)  
Brussels (BRU) Manchester (MAN)  
Cagliari (CAG) Marsella (MRS)  
Catania (CTA) Menorca (MAH)  
Krakow (KRK) Munich (MUC)  
Copenhaguen (CPH) Nantes (NTE)  
Köln-Bonn (CGN) Naples (NAP)  
Cork (ORK) Newcastle (NCL)  
Charleroi (CRL) Nice (NCE)  
Ciampino (CIA) Nuremberg (NUE)  
Dublin (DUB) Oslo (OSL)  
Dusseldorf (DUS) Palma de Mallorca (PMI)  
East Midlands (EMA) Palermo (PMO)  
Edimburgh (EDI) Paris-Charles de Gaulle (CDG)  
Faro (FAO) Paris-Orly (ORY)  
Fiumicino (FCO) Porto (OPO)  
Fuerteventura (FUE) Praga (PRG)  
Frankfurt (FRA) Pisa (PSA)  
Gatwick (LGW) Prestwick (PIK)  
Gran Canaria (LPA) Rhodes (RHO)  
Glasgow (GLA) Riga (RIX)  
Girona (GRO) Schonefeld (SFX)  
Ginebra (GVA) Seville (SVQ)  
Gotheborg (GOT) Shannon (SNN)  
Hahn (HNN) Sofia (SOF)  
Hamburg (HAM) Stansted (STN)  
Hannover (HAJ) Stavanger (SVG)  
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